SANA,
as dancing on the heads of snakes, has stayed in power for three
decades through a clever mix of money, tribal ploys and government
corruption.
But Saleh’s political capital is shrinking and his wiles are straining as
struggles with a civil war in the north, secession troubles in the
south and a battle against an al-Qaida affiliate that has drawn
As with former Pakistani President
Top American intelligence officials told Congress this week that
terrorist network was a major threat to U.S. interests. The Obama
administration is now warily increasing money and commitment to an Arab
leader criticized for manipulating crises for political gain and
tolerating militants as long as they unleashed their jihad in other
countries, such as
“Saleh is always maneuvering,” said AbdulSalam
Qarari, deputy editor of Afaq Gadidah magazine in Sana, the capital.
“He creates crises so he can play with them and use them for his
interests.”
The 67-year-old Saleh, who wears a meticulous
mustache and suits of muted colors, is facing increasing pressure amid
tumbling oil revenues, a water shortage and the government’s
diminishing grip on tribal lands scattered widely across mountains and
deserts.
Saleh has long been adept at deciphering his
country’s moods and passions. In recent years, however, he appears to
have spent less time tending to national problems than on fortifying
his family’s hold on power, most notably by preparing his son Ahmed,
chief of the Special Forces and the
The president’s political style follows that of other Arab leaders, such as Egyptian President
who create facades of democracy while ruling as strongmen over states
that run on patronage. In addition to his son, relatives holding key
positions include his half brother Mohammed, commander of the air
force, and his nephews Tarek, head of the Presidential Guard, and Amar,
deputy chief of
“Saleh’s a very good politician, but he hasn’t
understood that there is a big change in our society,” said Mohammed
AbdulMalik Mutawakel, a leader in a federation of opposition parties.
“He used to manage the public in three ways: By
satisfying with money, by using force, and by propaganda. All these
tactics are ineffective now. He has no money. He is already using all
the force he has. And with propaganda? People will believe him once,
twice, but no one will believe him now.”
What troubles the West is
Airstrikes against al-Qaida bases and training camps
have reportedly killed more than 60 militants since mid-December. The
U.S. is expected to double its military and counterterrorism aid to
about
Saleh’s critics accuse him of exploiting al-Qaida and other threats to attract foreign money, including
Yet, at the same time, he shows independence from the West for fear of
angering a populace disdainful of U.S. regional intervention.
It is a tricky strategy of a man playing both sides.
Saleh recently said he would open a dialogue with al-Qaida militants
who renounce violence. The overture was received well at home but it
left doubts in the West about the president’s zeal to destroy militant
networks.
In 2006,
police and security forces were suspected of helping more than 20
extremists escape from prison. That took pressure off his government
from radical Islamic Salafi voices, but now some of those escapees are
fighting alongside a resurgent al-Qaida group.
The fighting with the terrorist network and Houthi
Shiite rebels in the north is the result of years of ineffectual
government efforts to stem creeping dangers. The military campaigns
have not diverted attention from malnutrition, corruption, failing
schools, joblessness and other problems in
Money has a tendency to disappear in
Reports by U.S. organizations and others have found
systemic government corruption that includes thousands of “ghost
workers,” kickbacks to officials for government contracts and bribes to
judges. A U.S. report described
as a “bandit” state where one-third of the country’s 100,000 soldiers
exist only on paper, allowing their politically connected commanding
officers to reportedly pocket extra salaries and sell guns and
munitions on the black market.
“Grand corruption is not a tangential problem in
Rather, it is the glue that keeps things in place,” states the 2006
report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The president’s “political mandate is nonexistent.
The international attention and money and support may make him stronger
in one way, but that’s not enough,” said Naif Gunas, a spokesman for
parliamentary opposition coalition. “The power of the president depends
on two elements: the military and the tribes. . . . But he has become
less powerful with the tribes. They consider him a thief and oppose his
bad politics.”
Al-Qaida is trying to capitalize on Saleh’s
vulnerability. The organization has encouraged intermarriage of
militants and tribal women, and casts itself as a champion of tribal
rights.
In an audiotape released last year,
had done. Tribes are tough to sway, though, and some clan leaders
consider Islamic militants more of a liability than an unpopular
president.
But military strikes on al-Qaida cells on tribal
lands have infuriated sheiks. In one instance, a tribe in Marib
province fired antiaircraft rounds at government forces that attacked
the house of a militant leader. The assault was regarded as an affront
against the sheik whose duty is to protect the kinsmen on his land.
“The confrontation is now open,” said Abdulelah
Haider Shaeya, a Yemeni journalist covering militant networks. “Not the
government versus al-Qaida, but the government versus the tribesman.”
For years, Saleh, a former tank officer, has manipulated the incestuous nature of
in the late 1970s and became president of a unified country in 1990.
But his talent for buying loyalty and taming enemies with favors is
less assured these days.
“Saleh is in trouble,” Mutawakel said. “The U.S. will demand results and he’ll have to deliver, but I don’t know how.”
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