KABUL, Afghanistan — The residents of the Afghan capital,
both native and foreign, are waiting for President Obama — to make up his mind.
The president’s lengthy review of Afghan policy — the
results of which he’s finally expected to announce before Thanksgiving — has
created a dangerous sense of drift here. “I think everyone would feel much
better if we knew what we were doing,” one NATO officer told me.
“What does the final American contribution to this effort look like? We
have to lay this out. Everyone is waiting to respond to what we do.”
The absence of a clear U.S. policy — at a critical juncture
when the Taliban is gaining — has fed Afghan conspiracy theories that America
secretly supports the insurgents. Meanwhile, Obama’s delay has sapped domestic
support for continued military engagement, which in turn fans Afghans’ fears
that we will once again abandon their country.
The uncertainty about American intent also feeds the
perception here that the Taliban is winning. It undercuts the will of European
countries to stay on, even as the United Nations has pulled out hundreds of
staffers after a bomb destroyed one of its guesthouses.
So if Obama is to regain lost momentum, it is essential that
he lay out his decision with conviction, clarity, and commitment. Psychology is
key to this conflict: If Afghans and other governments in the region think the
United States is eyeing the exit, the Taliban’s momentum will increase, as will
the likelihood of chaos and civil war.
In the absence of a presidential decision, many Americans
are confused about why we’re even in Afghanistan, especially since al-Qaeda is
based next door in Pakistan. The reasons are complex: to keep insurgents from
precipitating the collapse or militant takeover of Afghanistan, with dire
consequences for nuclear-armed Pakistan; and to buy time for the Afghan
government to develop its own security forces.
In the meantime, the security burden will fall on
international forces. The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, reportedly believes 40,000 additional troops are needed to achieve
those goals; a decision to send far fewer would signal to the region that Obama
isn’t committed.
How would those troops be used? In the south, where the
Taliban is strong, it’s hoped that the influx would clear out the Taliban and
make it possible to pump in economic aid. The goal would be to link up small
protected areas to form a larger zone that’s sufficiently stable and prosperous
to show the population that there is an alternative to Taliban rule.
There are other possible ways to help Afghans undermine the
Taliban, although none is a silver bullet. In some parts of the country, tribal
militias may be encouraged to oppose the militants. In others, villages will
produce local protection forces. A robust plan to reintegrate low- and
mid-level Taliban into their communities also could undermine Taliban leaders.
Will any or all of these experiments work? I don’t know. But
I do know that in Iraq, small successes led to glimmers of optimism that, in
turn, created new opportunities. U.S. forces made their own luck in Iraq, and
they hope to do so in Afghanistan.
Would more U.S. troops lead to a nationalist rejection of
the foreign presence? As in Iraq, Afghans have an ambivalent relationship with
foreign troops. They welcomed them initially, in 2001, but were disappointed
that security got worse and the economy didn’t get better. If the Americans
could finally show results, I think most Afghans would tolerate them for the
time being; they don’t want the Taliban back.
As for corruption under President Hamid Karzai, there are
ways to work around him. Remember when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
central government was considered hopeless? That led U.S. officials to focus on
bottom-up work at the provincial level. The same approach can be taken in
Afghanistan.
My trip to the region also has convinced me that the
administration needs to:
Deliver economic aid more quickly. All the talk about
revamping the aid bureaucracy has failed to expedite vital funds.
Use any “civilian surge” to train Afghans, not do
the job ourselves.
Institute a clear chain of command for Afghanistan policy.
U.S. Embassy staffers in Kabul are looking over their shoulders to guess what
special envoy Richard Holbrooke would want, but he hasn’t been in Kabul for
months. Afghans aren’t certain who speaks for the U.S. president, which makes
it harder to press Karzai on reforms.
Keep domestic politics from undercutting the message to
Afghans. On ABC Sunday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: “We’re
not interested in staying in Afghanistan. We have no long-term stake
there.” She may have meant to reassure Americans that we have an exit
strategy, but to Afghans, her words reeked of pending betrayal.
To reverse the Taliban momentum, Obama needs to persuade
Afghans that he will stand behind them. Everyone in the region is awaiting his
announcement. It should be firm, clear, and strong.
Via McClatchy-Tribune News Service.
